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In this paper I examine the design of climate treaties when there exist two kinds of 
technology, a conventional abatement technology with (linearly) increasing marginal costs 
and a backstop technology (“air capture”) with high but constant marginal costs. I focus on 
situations in which countries can gain collectively by using both technologies. I show that, 
under some circumstances, countries will be better off negotiating treaties that are not cost-
effective. When countries prefer to negotiate self-enforcing agreements that are  cost-
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conference for their comments on the paper, and to Michael Hoel for inviting me to give the 
paper.   2 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
International environmental agreements are second best institutions. They can improve 
on unilateralism, but usually fall short of sustaining full cooperation. Climate change is a 
particularly difficult challenge. Because the marginal costs of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions increase sharply, at least beyond some point, the incentives to free ride are 
substantial—and impossible for an international environmental agreement to overcome 
using the usual mechanism of reciprocity. 
 
This is why other strategies need to be considered. A few papers have shown that, under 
certain circumstances, a technology-oriented strategy can help. Heal (1994) shows that 
cooperation can be facilitated when abatement costs are interdependent. Golombek and 
Hoel  (2004)  show  that  R&D  spillovers  may  cause  new  technologies  to  be  diffused 
globally—producing  a  kind  of  negative  leakage.  I  have  shown  that  R&D  directed  at 
technologies  exhibiting  strong  network  externalities  can  transform  the  problem  of 
deterring  free  riding  (Barrett  2006).  Finally,  Hoel  and  de  Zeeuw  (2009)  show  that 
cooperation in R&D can increase global abatement by reducing the costs of adopting a 
new technology.  In this paper I explore a different perspective. This is to consider two 
technologies that lower atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases in very different 
ways—a  conventional  abatement  technology  that  reduces  emissions  at  increasing 
marginal cost and a novel technology that reduces atmospheric concentrations directly by 
removing CO2 from the air. This novel technology, known generically as “air capture,” 
has a constant but very high marginal cost.    3 
 
There  are  a  number  of  ways  to  remove  CO2  from  the  air  (Barrett  2009).  Several 
approaches  exploit  the  process  of  photosynthesis.  Credits  for  afforestation  and 
reforestation are already incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol (avoided deforestation, the 
subject of ongoing negotiations, would limit additions to atmospheric concentrations). A 
related approach is to use biomass as a fuel for electricity generation, and then to capture 
and store the CO2 from combustion, resulting in negative net emissions. Another idea is 
to fertilize iron-limited regions of the oceans, to stimulate the growth of phytoplankton, 
which, if they sink to the deep ocean, will cause the surface waters to extract CO2 from 
the  air  to  restore  chemical  balance.  Unfortunately,  the  effects  of  all  these  biological 




In this paper I consider “industrial” air capture. This involves a technology that brings air 
into contact with a chemical “sorbent” (an alkaline liquid). The sorbent absorbs CO2 in 
the air, and the industrial process then separates out the CO2, recycles the sorbent, and 
stores the captured CO2 in geologic deposits, just like CO2 removed from a power plant’s 
stack gases. Industrial air capture has several desirable features (Sarewitz and Nelson 
2008).  It  would  be  decoupled  from  our  energy  systems,  and  could  be  located  near 
geologic sites for long-term carbon storage and away from population areas, where land 
has a low opportunity cost. It could also be scaled to any level. Conceivably, every other 




operations.”  (See  OSPAR  Decision  2007/02  on  Storage  of  Carbon  Dioxide  Streams  in  Geological 
Formations, June 2007.)    4 
aspect of the global economy could remain unaltered, and this technology be used to 
sustain  virtually  any  desired  reduction  in  atmospheric  levels  of  carbon.  From  the 
perspective of emission reductions, industrial air capture is a true “backstop technology.”  
 
Industrial  air  capture  is  expensive.  Estimates  of  marginal  cost  range  from  $100-
$200/tCO2.  Industrial air capture is much more costly than the alternatives for reducing 
emissions, including power plant CO2 capture and storage. Its marginal costs also exceed 
current  estimates  of  the  social  cost  of  carbon,  which  range  from  about  $7-$85/tCO2. 
However, the marginal cost of industrial air capture is lower than estimates of the cost of 
meeting a 2˚ C temperature change target by means of abatement technology by around 
2100.
2 In the future, use of industrial air capture may be collectively optimal. 
 
Though costly, industrial air capture has offsetting advantages. Because it acts directly on 
reducing  concentrations,  industrial  air  capture  offers  more  options  for  the  timing  of 
investment as compared with emission reductions (Pielke 2007). Even if the intention 
were not to deploy this technology, it may pay for us to develop it as a hedge against 
future climate change risks, given its unique ability to be scaled to reduce concentrations 
directly. Finally, unlike emission reductions, industrial air capture could be deployed by a 
single country, or by a “coalition of the willing.”  
  
In this paper my focus is on the effect of air capture on the design and efficiency of 
international  treaty  arrangements.  How  should  climate  treaties  be  designed  when 
                                                 
2 All of these estimates can be found in Barrett (2009).   5 
countries have the option not only to abate their emissions but also to employ industrial 
air capture as a backstop technology?  
 
2.  An abatement-only treaty 
 
Begin by considering the abatement decisions of countries in the absence of a multilateral 
agreement. Let 
￿ 
qi denote country i’s abatement and let Q denote aggregate abatement; 





∑ . Finally, let country i’s payoff be given by 
￿ 
π i = bQ−cqi
2 2. 
If  countries  choose  their  abatement  levels  independently,  there  exists  a  unique  Nash 
equilibrium in which every country i plays 
￿ 
qi = b c. If countries were able to cooperate 
fully, each would play 
￿ 
qi = bN c. 
 
A treaty can be represented as the equilibrium of a stage game, with countries deciding 
whether to participate in stage 1, with parties choosing their abatement levels collectively 
in stage 2, and with non-parties choosing their abatement levels independently in stage 3. 
As is usual, we solve the game backwards.  
 
Since the equilibrium of the earlier abatement game, 
￿ 
qi = b c, is in dominant strategies, it 
must  also  be  the  equilibrium  of  the  stage  3  game.  Letting  kq  denote  the  number  of 
signatories  to  the  abatement-only  agreement,  collective  maximization  by  signatories 
implies that each signatory must play  qs = bkq c in stage 2. Finally, letting 
￿ 
π s and 
￿ 
π n 
denote the payoff to a signatory and non-signatory, respectively, a Nash equilibrium of   6 
the  stage  1  game  is  a  participation  level  kq
*satisfying  πs(kq
*) ≥ πn(kq
* −1)  and 
πn(kq
*) ≥ πs(kq
* +1).  Upon  substitution,  it  is  easy  to  show  that  the  equilibrium 
participation level is kq
* = 3 for 
￿ 
N ≥ 3. Plainly, a treaty consisting of just 3 countries will 
not  make  much  of  a  difference  when  N  is  large.  The  agreement  increases  aggregate 
abatement from 
￿ 
bN c to just 
￿ 






Though this result emerges from a special model, it can be shown to be qualitatively 
robust  (Barrett  2005).  The  result  need  not  be  taken  literally  to  mean  that  only  three 
countries will cooperate. If the assumption about credibility is weakened just a little, then, 
in  a  repeated  game  context,  it  can  be  shown  that  the  level  of  participation  can  be 
increased all the way to N. The problem is that, as the participation level increases, the 
abatement  level  of  each  participant  must  fall  in  order  for  the  agreement  to  be  self-
enforcing (Barrett 2002).  A more general interpretation of this result is that a second best 
abatement treaty is likely to improve little on non-cooperation and fall far short of full 
cooperation. Though the model is implausibly simple, its prediction is consistent with the 
experience of negotiations thus far. The Kyoto Protocol may have caused some countries 
to reduce their emissions a little, but it has certainly not sustained full cooperation, and 
the Copenhagen Accord promises to do no better. 
 
3.  An air-capture-only treaty 
   7 
Assume now that countries can only mitigate climate change by means of air capture. Let 
zi  denote country i’s level of air capture, and assume  zi ∈[0,z]. I noted previously that 
air capture can be scaled to virtually any level. However, in this paper I assume that air 
capture and abatement are comparable in their effects—both yielding equal and constant 
marginal benefits. It is thus reasonable to think of air capture as being bounded in this 
static model to a level perhaps not much different than a year’s emissions. 
 
Let  Z  denote  the  aggregate  reduction  in  greenhouse  gas  concentrations  (relative  to 
business as usual) due to air capture; with N countries,  Z = zi
i=1
N
∑ . Finally, let country i’s 
payoff  be  given  by  πi = bZ −γ zi .  If  countries  choose  their  air  capture  levels 
independently, and if  γ > b, then there will exist a Nash equilibrium in which every 
country i plays  zi = 0 . If  γ > bN , then this equilibrium will also be first best. Let us 
assume, however, that γ < bN (this, as noted previously, is a situation in which we might 
find ourselves in the future). Then the above Nash equilibrium will be inefficient.  
 
Can a treaty help? Let us see. In stage 3, non-signatories will plainly play zn = 0. In stage 
2, signatories will play  zs = z  if  bkz ≥ γ  and  zs = 0  otherwise, where  kz denotes the 
number of parties to the air-capture-only treaty. Finally, in equilibrium, the number of 
signatories will be kz
* with γ b +1≥ kz
* ≥ γ b . 
 
Note that, while the equilibrium number of signatories to an air capture protocol can be 
large, when this number is large the overall gains to cooperation will be small. As with an   8 
abatement-only  treaty,  an  air-capture-only  treaty  can  improve  little  on  the  non-
cooperative outcome (though, as we shall see, unlike an abatement-only treaty, an air-
capture-only treaty may come close to sustaining full cooperation). 
 
4.  A combined protocol 
 
I  have  so  far  modeled  abatement  and  air  capture  as  independent  choices.  But  the 
equilibrium levels of marginal cost vary substantially as between the two agreements. In 
the equilibrium abatement protocol, marginal cost is 3b. In the equilibrium air capture 
protocol, marginal cost is  γ .  As explained previously, it is very likely that  γ >> 3b. 
This  means  that,  if  abatement  and  air  capture  are  addressed  in  separate  protocols, 
mitigation will not be cost-effective. 
 
It seems more plausible to assume that cooperating countries would want to negotiate a 
single agreement, with the decisions to abate and carry out air capture being optimized 
jointly.  How might such a treaty be designed? 
 
Because marginal benefits are assumed to be constant, the first order conditions for both 
abatement and air capture will be unchanged as compared with the previous analyses. 
Non-signatories will play  qn = b c and  zn = 0. Signatories will play  qs = k+b c, where 
k+  denotes the number of parties to the combined protocol; they will play  zs = z  for 
k+ ≥ γ b and  zs = 0  for  k+ < γ b. Of course, the non-cooperative and full cooperative 
outcomes will also be unchanged as compared with the earlier analyses.    9 
 
While  these  conditions  will  remain  unchanged,  the  treaty  equilibria  may  be  very 
different. So long as γ >> 3b, there will exist one treaty equilibrium in which parties to 
the  agreement  only  abate  their  emissions.  In  this  equilibrium,  each  of  the  kq
* = 3 
signatories will undertake three times the abatement as each non-signatory, and each non-
signatory will undertake the same level of abatement as in the non-cooperative outcome.  
No country will undertake air capture in this equilibrium (again, assuming γ >> 3b). 
 
If bN > γ  there may also exist a treaty equilibrium at γ b +1> kz
* > γ b . However, we 
cannot be sure that an agreement comprising this number of parties will be self-enforcing. 
The reason is that, in a combined protocol, the countries investing in air capture must 
undertake abatement at the same marginal cost, and we know that such a high level of 
abatement cannot be sustained by an abatement-only agreement—the incentives to free 
ride  are  too  great.    For  this  second  equilibrium  to  exist,  therefore,  the  returns  to  air 
capture must be large enough to offset the returns lost by foregoing free riding.  
 
For  γ b +1> kz
* > γ b   to  be  an  equilibrium  in  a  combined  treaty  we  must  have 
πn(k) ≥ πs(k +1) at kz
*.  That is, we require 
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which reduces to b
2k(k − 2)+ (γ − b)2cz ≥ 0. This condition will clearly be satisfied. 
 
We also require πs(k) ≥ πn(k −1) at kz
* or 
 












































2 + 2b(cz + 2b)k − (3b
2 + 2γcz) ≥ 0.          (1) 
 
This second condition may or may not be satisfied. It is more likely to be satisfied if c 
and z  are “large” and γ  is “small” (the effect of b is ambiguous).  
 





2 + 2γcz) ≥ 0.            (2) 
 
This  condition  is  necessary  for  an  agreement  with  k  parties  (where  k  is  the  smallest 
integer greater than  γ b) to be self-enforcing. Solving the quadratic in (1), this same 
value of k must lie between k  and k , where 














For a combined treaty comprising  k+
* countries to be self-enforcing, with  k+
* being equal 
to the smallest integer greater than γ b, we must have k+
* ∈[k,k]. 
 
Even though the model is very simple, I have been unable to obtain an analytical solution 
for the equilibrium, combined treaty. Table 1 presents simulations from which several 
conclusions follow:  
 
1.  An abatement-only treaty improves little over the non-cooperative outcome. The 
simulations thus confirm what we already knew. 
2.  The possibility of air capture can increase payoffs dramatically provided  z  is 
“large” or c is “large.” If  z is “large,” the trigger for air capture (k being larger 
than γ /b) reduces concentrations dramatically, delivering a substantial benefit to 
every country. If c is “large” very little abatement is done, with or without an 
abatement-only treaty, and air capture can therefore make a substantial difference 
to the overall level of mitigation. 
3.  As illustrated by Simulation I, a combined (and, therefore, cost-effective) protocol 
may not be self-enforcing. Put differently, an insistence on cost-effectiveness may 
cause air capture not to be used, even though every country would be better off if 
it were used in a separate treaty, part of a package of cost-ineffective mitigation 
arrangements. This result makes an important point: that cost-effectiveness may   12 
not  be  a  feature  of  a  second-best  treaty  arrangement;  that  a  focus  on  cost-
effectiveness could actually reduce welfare all around. 
4.  Comparison of Simulations I and II reveals that a combined protocol is more 
likely to be self-enforcing if the capacity for air capture,  z , is “large.” This, of 
course, is because the gains to adding air capture to an abatement treaty must be 
large enough to overcome the incentive to free ride in abatement. 
5.  As  suggested  by  a  comparison  of  Simulations  I  and  III,  a  higher  marginal 
abatement  cost,  c,  also  helps  to  make  a  combined  treaty  self-enforcing.    The 
reason  is  that,  when  c  is  “large,”  little  abatement  will  be  undertaken  even  if 
countries  cooperate  at  a  high  level  (k+
* ).  The  losses  an  individual  country 
experiences by cooperating in abatement (at  k+
* >> kq
*) will therefore be small, 
meaning that the benefits to cooperating in air capture do not need to be as large 
to make a combined treaty self-enforcing. 
6.  Comparison  of  Simulations  I  and  IV  shows  that a   lower  marginal  cost  of  air 
capture,  γ ,  has  a  similar  effect.  However,  in  this  case  the  equilibrium 
participation level falls. The losses to cooperating in abatement are reduced, but 
so are the gains to adding air capture. 
7.  Finally, comparison of Simulations IV and V shows that a higher marginal benefit 
to mitigation, b, also lowers the participation level in a self-enforcing, combined 
treaty (this is because the trigger for air capture is  k ≥ γ /b). Ironically, a higher 
marginal benefit shrinks the payoff to combining air capture and abatement.  
   13 
In a combined treaty, air capture provides a vehicle for raising the participation level 
among  countries  that  cooperate  to  reduce  their  emissions.  However,  this  helps  (in 
percentage terms) a lot only for Simulation IV, and in this case there is a wide gap (again, 
in percentage terms) between the aggregate payoff for a combined protocol and the full 
cooperative outcome.   
 
I  have  so  far  emphasized  the  overall  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  negotiating  a 
combined treaty. What are the implications for individual countries? Table 2 summarizes 
the payoffs to individual countries for the simulations in Table 1. Two perspectives are 
important. The first is the perspective countries might take to negotiating a combined 
treaty  after  the  abatement-only  and  air-capture-only  treaties  have  been  realized.  The 
second is the perspective countries might take to combining treaties before any treaty has 
been developed. In the latter case, countries have a symmetric perspective on the decision 
to combine. In the former case, they do not. 
 
Table 2 shows that, if the decision to negotiate separate or combined treaties is made in a 
preliminary stage, the perspective of every country will be identical, and the decision to 
negotiate  separate  treaties  or  a  combined  treaty  will  be  unanimous.  If  the  parameter 
values correspond to Simulation I, every country will prefer to negotiate separate treaties. 
They will eschew possibilities for cost-effectiveness. If the parameter values correspond 
to Simulations II-V, every country will prefer to negotiate a combined treaty in which 
abatement and air capture are cost-effective. 
   14 
If the decision of whether to combine treaties is made at a later stage, after countries have 
already  negotiated  separate  abatement  and  air  capture  treaties,  then  countries  may 
disagree. For Simulations II and III, non-signatories to the air-capture-only treaty will not 
want to negotiate a combined treaty, whether or not they are signatories to the abatement-
only treaty (their payoffs would be expected to fall from over $600,000 to just under 
$127,000). However, for both simulations, parties to the air-capture-only treaty prefer a 
combined treaty, and since the equilibrium number of parties will be the same for a 
combined treaty, we can be sure that a combined treaty will be sustained. 
   15 
TABLE 1 
Simulations 
Simulation  I  II  III  IV  V 
b  1  1  1  1  5 
c  1  1  1,000  1  1 


















z   10  7,500  10  10  10 
q
o  1  1  0.001  1  5 
Q
o  100  100  0.1  100  500 
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o   9,950  9,950  9.95  9,950  248,750 
qs
*  3  3  0.003  3  15 
Q
*  106  106  0.11  106  530 
πn
*  105.5  105.5  0.11  105.5  2,637.5 
πs
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*  800  600,000  800  200  40 
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*  800  600,000  800  200  200 
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*  16,400  12,300,000  16,400  16,100  19,220 
Q
* + Z
*  906  600,106  800.11  306  570 
 
Both 
protocols   Πq
* + Πz
*  26,938  12,310,538  16,411  26,638  282,670 
k+
*   --  80  80  20  4 
qs   --  80  0.08  20  20 
Q
* + Z
*   --  606,420  806.42  680  600 
πn   --  606,419.5  806.42  679.5  2,987.5 




















*   --  12,685,990  16,786  63,960  298,000 
q
c   100  100  0.1  100  500 
z
c   10  7,500  10  10  10 
Q
c + Z
c  11,000  760,000  1,010  11,000  51,000 
π



























c  520,500  15,875,000  21,000  580,500  12,980,500   16 
TABLE 2 
Payoffs to individual countries 
 
Simulation  I  II  III  IV  V 
Non-cooperative outcome  99.5  99.5  0.1  99.5  2,487.5 
Signatory to abatement-
only treaty/Non-signatory 
to air-capture-only treaty 
 






110.5  3,855.5  5.11  110.5  2,642.5 
Signatory to both treaties 
 
106.5  3,851.5  5.10  106.5  2,542.5 
Non-signatory to both 
treaties 
 
905.5  600,105.5  800.11  305.5  2,837.5 
Expected payoff with 
separate treaties 
269.4  123,105.4  164.1  266.4  2,826.7 
Non-signatory to 
combined treaty 
105.5  606,419.5  806.42  679.5  2,987.5 
Signatory to combined 
treaty 
101.5  6,970  8.22  480  2,800 
Expected payoff with 
combined treaty 
102.3  126,859.9  167.9  639.6  2,980 
Full cooperative outcome  5,205  158,750  210  5,805  129,805 
Who would favor a 
combined treaty? 


















Everyone  Everyone  
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5.  Air capture as a single project 
 
In the above analysis, I modeled air capture as a technology employed separately by 
different  countries.  However,  and  as  noted  in  the  introduction,  air  capture,  unlike 
abatement, needn’t be undertaken by a very large number of countries to have a big 
effect. Air capture can be deployed as a single project. The capacity for air capture at a 
particular location might be limited by the availability of geologic storage, but if CO2 
were to be sequestered in silicate minerals, then this constraint would be eased (though at 
an additional cost).  
 
Let us then consider a situation in which the amount of air capture undertaken overall is 
constrained, such that  zi ≤ Z
i=1
N
∑ . Then,  kz
*will again be the smallest integer greater than 
or equal to γ b. However, the level of air capture undertaken for this k will now be  Z  
rather than  kz
*z  (these values could, by chance, be equal). In this case, changes in the 
equilibrium participation level,  kz
*, will not change the amount of air capture undertaken 
in  an  air-capture-only  treaty.  In  contrast  to  the  previous  analysis,  the  amount  of  air 
capture undertaken will be efficient. What will change, as participation changes, is the 
arrangement for cost sharing. 
 
When air capture is undertaken as a single project, the variablezi is best thought of as a 
financing share. That is, for kz ≥ γ /b, each party to the treaty contributes an amount γ zi
, with  γ zi i ∑ = γ Z . In this model, countries are symmetric, and so the only plausible   18 
financing equilibrium is one in which parties share the total cost equally—this amount 
being γ Z / kz
*.  
 
Using this formulation, for kz














































which reduces to b
2k(k − 2)(k +1)+ 2cγ Z ≥ 0.  This condition will clearly be satisfied. 
 
We also require πs(kz
*) ≥ πn(kz
* −1). Upon substituting, we get  
 









































   
 






2 + b(2cZ − 3b)k − 2cγ Z ≥ 0.            (3) 
 
This second condition may or may not be satisfied.  
 
Once again, I rely on simulations. The simulations shown in Table 3 correspond to the 
ones in Table 1 with the exception of air capture capacity. So that the results are broadly   19 
compatible, I assume that aggregate capacity is identical; that is, I take it that Z = zN .  In 
comparing Tables 1 and 3, we can see that mitigation levels and payoffs are higher when 
air capture can be undertaken as a single project. In percentage terms, the difference is 
particularly  noticeable  for  Simulations  IV  and  V.    In  these  cases,  a  relatively  small 
number of countries deploy air capture in a self-enforcing treaty.  For the simulations in 
Table 1, these countries undertake relatively little air capture, since the maximum amount 
per country is fixed. For the simulations in Table 3, these countries undertake a lot more, 
since only the total amount of air capture is fixed. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
The literature on international environmental agreements has tended to put technology is 
a  “black  box.”  However,  an  emerging  literature  shows  that  technologies  may  have 
features  that  affect  the  incentives  for  countries  to  cooperate,  and  the  design  of  self-
enforcing-treaties. This paper extends this body of research. Starting from the canonical 
model of cooperation in reducing emissions, I allow countries to employ a “backstop 
technology,” either in a separate treaty or a combined treaty. For climate change, this 
backstop technology is industrial “air capture.” 
 
The model developed here offers three important insights. First, while economists have 
overwhelmingly  favored  cost-effective  treaty  designs,  this  paper  shows  that  there  are 
situations in which separate treaties pertaining to different technologies may be superior 
overall,  even  though  the  resulting  mitigation  is  not  cost-effective.  Second,  where  a   20 
combined treaty is to be preferred to separate treaties, the reason is not only that the 
combined treaty sustains cost-effective abatement. It is that deployment of the backstop 
technology ratchets up cooperation in ordinary abatement. Finally, if countries persist in 
failing  to  reduce  emissions  substantially,  and  marginal  damages  increase  as  a 
consequence, use of the backstop technology will eventually be triggered. In an extreme 
scenario in which the capacity for undertaking air capture is very, very great, and air 
capture can be undertaken as a single project, marginal damages overall will be limited 
and equal to the marginal cost of the backstop technology.  
   21 
TABLE 3 
Simulations: Single Project 
Simulation  I  II  III  IV  V 
b  1  1  1  1  5 
c  1  1  1,000  1  1 


















Z   1,000  750,000  1,000  1,000  1,000 
q0   1  1  0.001  1  5 
Q0  100  100  0.1  100  500 

























  9,950  9,950  9.95  9,950  248,750 
qx
*  3  3  0.003  3  15 
Q
*  106  106  0.11  106  530 
πn
*   105.5  105.5  0.11  105.5  2,637.5 
πs


























*   10,538  10,538  10.5  10,538  263,450 
kz
*  80  80  80  20  4 
Z
*  1,000  750,000  1,000  1,000  1,000 
πn
*   1,000  750,000  1,000  1,000  5,000 
πs











































*  20,500  15,375,000  20,500  80,500  480,500 
Q
* + Z
*  1,106  750,106  1,000.11  1,106  1,530 
 
Both 
protocols   Πq
* + Πz
*  31,038  15,385,538  20,510.5  91,038  743,950 
k+
*   --  80  80  20  4 
qs
*  --  80  0.08  20  20 
Q+
* + Z+
*  --  756,420  1,006.42  1,480  1,560 
πn
*   --  756,419.5  1,006.42  1,479.5  7,787.5 
πs




















*   --  15,760,990  20,886  124,460  758,500 
q
c   100  100  0.1  100  500 
z
c   10  7,500  10  10  10 
Q
c + Z
c  11,000  760,000  1,010  11,000  51,000 
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TABLE 4 
Payoffs to individual countries 
 
Simulation  I  II  III  IV  V 
Non-cooperative outcome  99.5  99.5  0.1  99.5  2,487.5 
Signatory to abatement-
only treaty/Non-signatory 
to air-capture-only treaty 
 






111.75  4,793  6.36  130.5  2,762.5 
Signatory to both treaties 
 
107.75  4,789  6.35  126.5  2,662.5 
Non-signatory to both 
treaties 
 
1,105.5  750,105.5  800.11  1,105.5  7,637.5 
Expected payoff with 
separate treaties 
310.38  153,855.4  166.3  325.4  3,734.5 
Non-signatory to 
combined treaty 
105.5  756,419.5  1,006.42  1,479.5  7,787.5 
Signatory to combined 
treaty 
101.5  7,907.5  9.47  3,050  2,725 
Expected payoff with 
combined treaty 
102.3  157,609.9  208.9  1,793.6  6,775 
Full cooperative outcome  5,205  158,750  210  5,805  129,805 
Who would favor a 
combined treaty? 
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